|
Weakness of Constitutional Judgment Enforcement Mechanisms: A Comparative Study of Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon
|
Davoud Mohebbi1   , Zaid Al-Arad2 |
1- Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.
2- PhD Student, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran |
|
|
Abstract: (16 Views) |
| This research addresses the issue of weak mechanisms for implementing constitutional rulings in Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon through an analysis of legal and jurisprudential texts and rulings issued by constitutional courts. This analysis is conducted in light of the nature of judicial review and its connection to the concept of constitutional supremacy and the protection of rights and freedoms. Constitutional review has evolved through various historical stages until it became established as a specialized judicial review aimed at ensuring the constitutionality of laws and protecting the principle of legality. However, experience has revealed a number of problems that hinder the effective implementation of constitutional rulings. These problems are mainly represented by the inadequacy of the courts' jurisdiction, the absence of mandatory review mechanisms, and the requirement of standing for appeals to be accepted. There are also procedural obstacles related to form and jurisdiction, in addition to the lack of institutional follow-up to ensure the implementation of rulings. These combined shortcomings weaken the ability of constitutional courts to fulfill their role as guardians of the constitution and guarantors of rights and freedoms. This raises questions about the effectiveness of judicial oversight in the three countries and the necessity of reforming existing mechanisms to align with the philosophy of constitutional supremacy. The study reveals that constitutional ambiguity is not an exceptional flaw confined to a single experience, but rather a common characteristic among Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon, although its manifestations differ from one country to another. In Iraq, it appeared in the dispute over the interpretation of the phrase "the largest parliamentary bloc" and in the jurisdictional conflict regarding water distribution between federal and regional authorities. In Egypt, it was linked to the absence of an explicit provision specifying the body responsible for interpretation before the enactment of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law of 1979. In Lebanon, it stemmed from the constitution's failure to designate an exclusive authority for interpretation, thus opening the door to disputes among the three branches of government over this right. |
|
|
| Keywords: Constitutional Review, Enforcement of Constitutional Judgments, Federal Supreme Court, Supreme Constitutional Court, Constitutional Council, Constitutional Supremacy, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon. |
|
|
Full-Text [PDF 591 kb]
(7 Downloads)
|
Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Special
Received: 2026/08/31 | Revised: 2026/08/31 | Accepted: 2026/09/24 | Published: 2026/09/24
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Add your comments about this article |
|
|
|
.png)
