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Effectiveness of Parliamentary, Judicial, and Administrative Oversight of Presidential Discretion in Iraq and Egypt
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Dawoud Mohebbi1 , Mohammad Fadel Al-Maamoori2  |
1- Assistant Professsor, Public Law Department, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran. 2- Phd Student, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran. |
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Abstract: (13 Views) |
| This study analyzes the effectiveness of parliamentary, constitutional, judicial, and administrative oversight of presidential discretionary powers in Iraq and Egypt. It approaches oversight as the practical condition that turns constitutional constraints into enforceable guarantees. Its central problem is that the existence of numerous monitoring bodies does not itself prevent the misuse of discretion unless those bodies can obtain documents, scrutinize the reasons for decisions, and impose legally effective outcomes. Adopting an analytical and comparative method, the article studies parliamentary scrutiny, constitutional courts, administrative adjudication, financial audit, and independent regulatory institutions within the distinct constitutional arrangements of the two countries. In Iraq, the parliamentary system and the constitutional position of the presidency subject significant presidential decisions to shared procedures, while the Federal Supreme Court plays a key role in constitutional interpretation and dispute resolution. Egypt has a different institutional structure, in which parliamentary accountability interacts with the Supreme Constitutional Court, the State Council, and specialized financial and administrative control bodies. The comparative analysis identifies important practical obstacles, including restrictions on access to information, secrecy in sensitive executive matters, procedural delay, and the doctrine of acts of sovereignty. It argues for graduated oversight that becomes more searching when rights are restricted or executive decisions enter areas normally reserved to the legislature. Effective safeguards require reasoned decisions, meaningful document access, transparent reporting, institutional independence, and timely judicial remedies. |
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| Keywords: Presidential Discretion, Parliamentary Oversight, Constitutional Adjudication, Administrative Review, Accountability. |
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Full-Text [PDF 636 kb]
(7 Downloads)
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Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Special Received: 2026/10/22 | Accepted: 2026/02/20 | Published: 2026/02/20
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